7 Ways To Appear Smarter In Everyday Life

I am here to dispel a myth: While I am intelligent, I have not yet reached the level of Einstein. There you go. Now, could you please explain that to my family, friends, coworkers, and business associates.

I am not here to brag about how smart I am. This post merely exists to show you how you can look like a member of Mensa to the average American, with a minimum of effort.

1. Learn to use Google. Are you one of those people who Google stuff all the time, and yet never seem to find anything? What do you do? You go to a professional Googler, like me, and they find “used bungee cords” in a matter of seconds. How?

We know how to talk to Google. While Google is getting smarter, it still has a hard time knowing exactly what you want. If you type in the word “colour”, Google still does not recognize that it is the exact same word as “color”. Google can only process the information we give it.

How many of you have ever used the advanced search portion of Google? Probably 10% or less, and yet that is how you can drill down to what you really want. Is the page less than 10 days old, do you want it in a PDF or Word document? The more you tell Google, the better results you will get.

There are tons of resources online that will show you how to search more accurately. Just Google it.

2. Use spell check, but don’t depend on it. I wish I had dollar for every time I used “their” when I meant “there”, and vice-versa. Also, watch out for “too” and “two”, “who’s” and “whose”. It is also helpful to know the difference between “its” and “it’s”. Spell check will let all these past without a whimper, because they are all spelled correctly. A firm grasp of the meaning of these words will help you evade embarrassment, and give you a more polished image at work and play.

3. Know the difference between “i.e.” and “e.g.”. Want to see a film called “Revenge of the English Majors”? Misuse these, and I can guarantee you a front row seat. Many people use “i.e.” interchangeably with the term “for example”. This is technically wrong. The term i.e. translates from the Latin as “that is”. If you wanted to say “for example”, “e.g.” would be the appropriate abbreviation.

4. Have a basic idea of where things are in the world. When 50% of college aged kids can’t find New York state on a map, you know we’re in trouble as a nation. If you can tell someone that “Niger” is in Africa, then you will be considered a Geography genius.

5. Collect general knowledge, or as most people refer to it, “useless information”. “Useless information” is something of a misnomer. It is only useless if it is never used. You never know when you might need that obscure fact about the gross domestic product of Germany, or how to open a beer with your belt loop. So take great pains to obtain it, and use it to benefit your fellow man.

6. Don’t be afraid to break stuff. We are afraid to mess things up in our culture. You will find that you will accomplish much more than other people by overcoming the fear of screwing things up. Most people don’t build their own computers simply because they are afraid of damaging the parts. I babied every part as I gingerly put my first PC together. Now, I use “fragile” RAM as everything but a Frisbee, and it still works. Experience will teach you what you can and can’t do. So go ahead, take a plunge into the deep end.

7. Don’t be afraid to say “I have no idea”. If I could pass one thing on to you, it would be this. Once you know all this stuff, it becomes harder to admit that you don’t know everything. It’s even harder to watch a person who wanted an answer “right now”, go back to their cube with a dejected look on their face. In the long run, people will respect you for it.

General Conditions of Thought

There are multitudinous conditions of concrete thought of an accidental sort, both physiological and psychological; and there are certain other conditions given in the very structure of thought itself. Only the latter concern us here. And as consciousness is the absolute condition of all thought, it seems as if a discussion of consciousness were a necessary preliminary to the theory of thought.

This seeming, however, is misleading. Since consciousness is an accompaniment of all mental states, it is easy to think that it is a distinct element by itself. This is a logical illusion. The spatial figures also in which we speak of consciousness lead to the fancy that consciousness is something which contains other mental states, or which furnishes the stage for their operations. But in fact consciousness is no simple, homogeneous mental state antecedent to objects, or apart from objects; it arises only in connection with particular objects, and is nothing by itself. When consciousness is empty of objects there is nothing left.

Consciousness may, indeed, exist in varying grades of clearness, from a vague sense of subjectivity and objectivity up to the distinct consciousness of self and the definite apprehension of an object; but in every case the vagueness of the consciousness is the vagueness of the apprehension; and an attempt to make the consciousness more distinct could only direct itself to making the conception more distinct. If there be a vague, undifferentiated, unrecognized somehowness of feeling which we choose to call consciousness, it is plainly nothing for intelligence so long as it remains in this state. In order to attain to rationality this general consciousness, which is a consciousness of nothing, must in some way become a consciousness of something. Hence the question, How we come to rational and articulate consciousness, is identical with the question, How we get objects of thought and knowledge.

Thought, as apprehending truth, exists only in the form of the judgment. The presence of ideas in consciousness, or their passage through it, is neither truth nor error, but only a mental event. Truth or error emerges only when we reach the judgment. The fundamental conditions of the judgment, therefore, must be fundamental conditions of thought itself. These are three: the unity and identity of the thinking self, the law of identity and contradiction, and the fact of connection among the objects of thought.

The first is the condition of any rational consciousness whatever. The second is the condition of our thoughts having any constant and consistent meaning. The third refers to that objective connection which thought aims to reproduce, and without which thought loses all reference to truth. As the first relates to the constitution of the subject, it might be called the subjective condition; the second might be called the formal condition; and the third, as relating to the constitution of the object, might be called the objective condition. Or, without too great inaccuracy, they might be called, respectively, the psychological, the logical, and the ontological condition of thought. The name, however, is of no moment, provided we understand the thing.

We consider first the unity of the mental subject as the condition of thought. Let us take the judgment a is b, where a and b are any two particular states of consciousness. How is this judgment possible?
The answer is, It is possible only as there is a conscious subject M, which is neither a nor b, but embraces both in the unity of its own consciousness. Then, by distinguishing, comparing, and uniting them in the unity of one conscious act, it reaches the judgment a is b. But so long as we have only the particular states a and b, they remain external to each other, and the judgment is non-existent and impossible.

A demurrer is sometimes raised against this conclusion. That the external juxtaposition of particular thoughts can never become a thought of the particulars in their mutual relations is manifest. A conception of all the parts of a watch in separation is not a conception of the watch. The conception of the watch is not a congeries of component conceptions, but it is rather a single, unitary conception. In like manner, it is urged, the judgment is also one. It is not built out of particular states, and needs nothing beyond the one judging act itself.

This claim is subtle rather than profound. There is a clear conception of the impossibility of building complex conceptions out of simple ones by mere juxtaposition; but along with this there is a confusion of logical simplicity with psychological simplicity. Psychologically, no doubt, the conception of plurality is as truly a single act as the conception of unity. The conception of a watch is as truly one as the conception of a single wheel. But logically the one conception has a plurality of elements; and there can be no true thought until the unity of the conception is distinguished into the plurality of its implications. Over against the plurality we must affirm a unity; and, equally, over against the unity we must affirm plurality.

Analysis is as necessary as synthesis. The judgment, then, may be psychologically one, but logically it involves the distinction of a and b as well as their union. Without this distinction the judgment is impossible. And for this logical distinction and union alike we need something which is neither a nor b, but which comprehends and acts upon both. This something we call the self. By it we mean not anything sensuously or imaginatively presentable, but only that unitary and abiding principle revealed in thought, and without which thought is impossible.

The judgment as an act is unique and lonely. Physical images only serve to obscure it, or, rather, contradict it. The field of consciousness is spaceless and partitionless. Our objects are separated, but not in space or time. They are united, but not spatially or temporally. The relation is logical, not physical, and does not admit of being pictured. The attempt to construe it to the imagination misses its true nature, and leads to that mechanical externalism which seeks to build up mind from without. How the judging act is possible is the unparalleled mystery of consciousness. But then it is a fact; and the unity of the thinking self is not an hypothesis for its explanation, but its analytically necessary condition. Without this a and b fall asunder, and the judgment is impossible.

Over against the plurality of coexistent particular states the self must be one; over against the plurality of successive particular states the self must be both one and abiding. The latter necessity is as manifest as the former. For if we suppose the particular states to be in time, they vanish as fast as they are born; and if there be nothing which abides across this flow and unites the past and the present in the unity of its continuous and identical existence, once more the judgment becomes impossible.

We conclude, then, that the unity and identity of the thinking self is an absolutely necessary condition of the simplest and most elementary judgment.

This account of the matter is not accepted by all. A very general claim of the sensational and physiological school is that a simple passive consciousness is possible which is made up of particular units of feeling or impressions; and these impressions, when united by association, are supposed to give us the judgment as a matter of course. On this view there is no unitary self which judges; but there are particular impressions grouped by association, and this grouping is the judgment.